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Povzetek
Naslov: Odkrivanje anomalij v racˇunalniˇskih omrezˇjih z uporabo odvisnosti
viˇsjega reda
Dandanes poznamo neomejeno sˇtevilo omrezˇnih napadov, ki izkoriˇscˇajo
ranljivosti v strukturi Interneta in omrezˇnih protokolov. V nasˇem delu se
lotimo problema zaznavanja anomalij v omrezˇnem prometu z vidika omrezˇne
znanosti. Interakcije med razlicˇnimi omrezˇnimi protokoli modeliramo kot di-
namiko v grafu. Prikazˇemo, da je obicˇajni pristop izgradnje grafa mocˇno ome-
jen in neprimeren za modeliranje vzorcev v poteh, ki vsebujejo vecˇ kot dva
koraka. Razvijemo metodo za zaznavanje anomalij, ki temelji na uposˇtevanju
vzorcev viˇsjega reda in prikazˇemo, da pravilno zazna poplavo UDP paketkov.
Raziˇscˇemo tudi medsebojno interakcijo med omrezˇnimi protokoli in naj-
pogostejˇse vzorce v omrezˇnem prometu.
Kljucˇne besede
anomalije v omrezˇnem prometu, omrezˇni napadi, omrezˇna znanost, odvisnosti
viˇsjega reda, omrezˇni protokoli

Abstract
Title: Anomaly detection in computer networks using higher-order depen-
dencies
Nowadays, countless network attacks are known, exploiting the vulnera-
bility of network protocols and Internet topology. In our work, we tackle the
problem of anomaly detection in computer communication networks from the
standpoint of network analysis. We model the interactions between different
network protocols as dynamics in a graph. We demonstrate that the tradi-
tional approach to constructing a graph is inadequate and fails to capture
correlations in paths of length larger than two. We devise an anomaly detec-
tion procedure based on higher-order dependencies and show that it correctly
identifies an UDP flood attack. We give insights into how computer commu-
nication protocols interact and what are the most common traffic patterns
in the Internet.
Keywords
network anomalies, network attacks, network science, higher-order dependen-
cies, Internet protocols

Razsˇirjeni povzetek
I Uvod
V magistrskem delu se osredotocˇimo na anomalije v omrezˇnem prometu,
v okviru interakcije med omrezˇnimi protokoli na aplikacijski in transportni
plasti TCP/IP modela. Zaznave anomalij se lotimo s pomocˇjo omrezˇne
znanosti, relativno nove vede, ki je postala uporabna za modeliranje inter-
akcij med entitetami v realnem svetu. Najpomembnejˇsi prispevki omrezˇne
znanosti so spoznanja, da si omrezˇja predstavljena s formalizmom grafa,
delijo skupne lastnosti in izkazujejo posebne zakonitosti. Najbolj znane ap-
likacije omrezˇne znanosti so napovedovanje interakcij med entitetami v pri-
hodnosti [1], dolocˇanje pomembnosti posameznih vozliˇscˇ v omrezˇjih [2, 3, 4]
in odkrivanje skupin vozliˇscˇ, ki so podobno povezana z ostalimi vozliˇscˇi v
omrezˇju [5].
Uporabo omrezˇnih protokolov modeliramo z grafi, kjer so vozliˇscˇa posamezni
protokoli, povezave pa oznacˇujejo zaporedno uporabo dveh protokolov. Za
zaznavanje anomalij in vzorcev uporabe protokolov se osredotocˇimo na di-
namiko v omrezˇjih. Sama beseda ”dinamika”oznacˇuje procese, ki se sprem-
injajo s cˇasom in pomeni nasprotje klasicˇnih staticˇnih omrezˇij. Pred kratkim
so raziskovalci ugotovili, da je obicˇajna predstavitev omrezˇij z grafom neza-
dostna, saj ni zmozˇna opisati korelacij v poteh dolzˇine vecˇ kot dve. Posebno
pozornost so dobile odvisnosti viˇsjega reda, ki omogocˇajo bolj natancˇno mod-
eliranje interakcij in dinamike v omrezˇjih.
i
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II Odvisnosti viˇsjega reda
Pri obicˇajnem pristopu v omrezˇni znanosti zaporedje podatkov oziroma lokacij
modeliramo z grafom in sicer tako, da mnozˇico lokacij preslikamo v vozliˇscˇa,
vsa pod-zaporedja dolzˇine dve (poti) pa v povezave. Tako npr. za zaporedje
A, B, A, A, B, C, B, A, B dobimo mnozˇico vozliˇscˇ V = {A,B,C} ter
mnozˇico povezav E = {AB,BA,AA,BC,CB,BA,AB}. Vrsta del na po-
drocˇju odvisnosti viˇsjega reda je pokazala, da je taksˇen pristop mocˇno ome-
jen na dolocˇenih vrstah podatkov [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Pomembno je uposˇtevati
tudi odvisnosti viˇsjega reda oziroma poti dolzˇine vecˇ kot dve. V kolikor za
zgornjo sekvenco uposˇtevamo tudi poti dolzˇine tri, dobimo mnozˇico vozliˇscˇ
V = {AB,BA,AA,BC,CB} ter mnozˇico povezav E = {ABA,BAA,AAB,
ABC,BCB,CBA,BAB}. Dobljenemu grafu pravimo tudi graf drugega
reda, saj modelira interakcije dolzˇine tri. Opazimo, da vozliˇscˇa v taksˇnih
grafih niso vecˇ lokacije v fizicˇnem smislu temvecˇ sedaj vsebujejo podatek o
zgodovini nakljucˇnega sprehajalca v grafu. Fizicˇna lokacija B ima tako npr.
dve pripadajocˇi vozliˇscˇi drugega reda, AB in CB.
Scholtes [9] v svojem delu predstavi splosˇno ogrodje za modeliranje odvis-
nosti viˇsjega reda, vse do najvecˇje velikosti spomina K. Verjetnosti prehodov
med vozliˇscˇi v omrezˇju viˇsjega reda so podane v enacˇbi (3.1). Cˇasovna
omrezˇja, kjer imajo povezave tudi cˇasovno oznako, ki oznacˇuje kdaj se povezava
zgodi, se lepo navezujejo na odvisnosti viˇsjega reda. Glavni povzrocˇitelj
odvisnosti viˇsjega reda so korelacije v vrstnem redu obiska lokacij. Cˇasovne
oznake lahko mocˇno vplivajo na ta vrstni red in povzrocˇijo nenatancˇnost v
obicˇajnem modeliranju omrezˇij.
III Zaznavanje anomalij
Enacˇbo (3.1) uporabimo v postopku za zaznavanje anomalij v dinamiki omrezˇij.
Ideja zaznavanja anomalij temelji na primerjavi dveh modelov odvisnosti
viˇsjega reda. Model s krajˇsim spominom Mk−1 primerjamo z modelom z
daljˇsim spominom Mk. V kolikor je odvisnost reda k statisticˇno znacˇilna,
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potem jo bo model s krajˇsim spominom napovedal kot odstopanje od trenut-
nih verjetnosti, shranjenih v modelu, model z zadostnim spominom pa jo bo
prepoznal kot v skladu s prehodnimi verjetnostmi. Omenjen postopek lahko
preprosto razsˇirimo na zaznavanje anomalij, kjer model naucˇen na ucˇnih po-
datkih oznacˇi vsako pot iz testnih podatkov kot bodisi v skladu z modelom
ali kot odstopanje od modela.
Sam postopek preverimo nad umetno generiranimi podatki, ki vsebu-
jejo vnaprej dolocˇene odvisnosti viˇsjega reda. Rezultati kazˇejo, da postopek
pravilno zazna odvisnosti viˇsjega reda in pravilno napove odstopanje od
naucˇenega modela.
IV Rezultati
Razvito metodo za zaznavanje anomalij preizkusimo v omrezˇjih, ki vsebu-
jejo omrezˇne protokole in njihovo zaporedno uporabo. Sprva dolocˇimo vlogo
vozliˇscˇ v omrezˇju, katera so ciljna vrata v protokolih TCP in UDP. Samim
vratom dodamo sˇe oznako, ali se je ciljni IP naslov zamenjal ali ostal enak.
Povezava pomeni zaporedno uporabo protokola s strani enega uporabnika
v omrezˇju. Sprva preizkusimo podatke CAIDA [11] in ugotovimo, da je
pomembno uposˇtevati tudi karakteristike omrezˇja ter kako so bili podatki
pridobljeni. Odvisnosti viˇsjega reda namrecˇ v podatkh CAIDA niso bile
prisotne zaradi premajhnega prekrivanja med potmi razlicˇnih uporabnikov.
Na podatkih iz omrezˇja Berkeley iz leta 1995 [12] odkrijemo odvisnosti
viˇsjega reda pri interakciji omrezˇnih protokolov. V tabeli 5.2 prikazˇemo
nekaj najbolj zanimivih odkritih odvisnosti, ki so hkrati v skladu z nasˇim
razumevanjem delovanja omrezˇnih protokolov. Sliki 5.1 in 5.2 dodatno prikazˇeta
kako se prehodne verjetnosti spremenijo, pri uposˇtevanju vecˇje zgodovine
obiska vozliˇscˇ.
Metodo zaznavanja anomalij preizkusimo nad podatki UCLA CSD [13], ki
vsebujejo umetno generiran ”UDP flood”napad. Sam napad poteka tako, da
napadalec posˇlje vecˇ velikih UDP paketov na nakljucˇna vrata zˇrtve, pri tem
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pa ponaredi izvorni IP naslov. Rezultati so pokazali, da je napad zaznan kot
odstopanje v normalnem prometu in sicer smo nasˇli preko 700 000 neobicˇajnih
vzorcev drugega in tretjega reda. Hkrati smo ugotovili, da model, ki uposˇteva
odvisnosti viˇsjega reda, bolj natancˇno napove odstopanja od normalnega
prometa, v primerjavi z obicˇajnim modeliranjem omrezˇij.
V Zakljucˇek
V delu smo se ukvarjali z analizo delovanja omrezˇnih protokolov in njihove
interakcije. Zanimalo nas je predvsem kako uporabniki in naprave v komu-
nikacijskih omrezˇjih uporabljajo omrezˇne protokole ter kateri so najpogostejˇsi
vzorci. V neposredni povezavi z najpogostejˇsimi vzorci v omrezˇnem prometu
so anomalije, ki so predstavljene kot odstopanje od normalnega prometa. Z
modeliranjem dinamike kot odvisnosti viˇsjega reda smo bili zmozˇni pokazati
ne le da je pomembno uposˇtevati korelacije v daljˇsih poteh, temvecˇ tudi
zaznati preprosti ”UDP flood”napad.
Nasˇ postopek je seveda mozˇno izboljˇsati, predvsem bi bilo potrebno pri-
dobiti vecˇ uporabnih podatkov za testiranje zaznavanja anomalij. Glavna
slabost modela je ta, da je potrebna velika kolicˇina ucˇnih podatkov, v ko-
likor se zˇelimo izogniti t.i. ”false positive”primerom. Verjamemo pa, da je
glavni prispevek dela zavedanje, da so odvisnosti viˇsjega reda pomembne pri
modeliranju in so prisotne tudi v komunikacijskih omrezˇjih.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Network science, a relatively new discipline, provides a fundamental realiza-
tion that many interactions in the modern world can be described as net-
works. As a consequence, the methods of network science are now widely
applicable in both social and natural sciences. Examples of networks that
have been studied include various social networks [14], traffic networks [15],
e-mail networks [16], mobile communication networks [17], citation networks
[18] and even biological intracellular networks [19]. Each network may ex-
hibit special properties and several different types of networks may be based
a common set of principles. Such is for example the scale-free property, where
the degree distribution of nodes in the network follows a power-law rule [20].
Also known as the 80/20 rule, the power-law rule states that roughly 20 per-
cent of all nodes are linked by the remaining 80 percent of nodes. The highly
linked nodes are known as hubs and directly affect how quickly information
can travel in the network.
The most well known applications of network science include link predic-
tion, node importance and community detection methods. Link prediction
enables us to predict which nodes in the network are most likely to interact
in the future (i.e. become linked, connected) [1]. These methods are fre-
quently used in recommendation systems. Node importance is perhaps most
well known due to the famous PageRank algorithm for ranking web pages
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in search results [4]. In addition, there are numerous other methods which
measure node importance [2, 3]. Last but not least, community detection al-
lows discovery of node groups in which there is more intra- than inter-group
communication, revealing clusters in the network [5].
Arguably the largest physical human made network, the Internet, has
also been extensively analyzed in the field of network science. Among the
results are the realizations of special topological properties of the Internet,
such as link redundancy and the scale-free property [21]. However, no real
analysis has yet been performed on common user traffic in computer commu-
nication networks, from a network analysis perspective. We are specifically
interested in how devices in the Internet communicate and what sequences
of network protocols are most frequent. In our work, we construct network
representations where nodes correspond to computer-network protocols and
interactions to sequential use of these protocols.
The downside of inter-connectivity which the Internet offers, is its vul-
nerability. Countless network attacks are known today [22], abusing the net-
work topology of routers, switches and vulnerabilities in network protocols.
Of the most common attacks in computer communication networks, DDoS
(Distributed Denial of Service) attacks rank high. There are various ways
to classify DDoS attacks and the majority of such attacks exploit either a
specific protocol or application [23]. In general, a victim is overwhelmed with
artificial network packets that arrive from a large set of infected endpoints in
the network, and rendered inoperable. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are
agents in the network, which actively monitor the traffic in an attempt to de-
tect such anomalies. Two major types of IDS systems exist. Signature-based
systems use pattern-matching techniques to match an anomaly in the net-
work with a database of pre-recorded known attacks, while anomaly-based
systems build a statistical model of the normal network traffic and then at-
tempt to detect any deviation from this normality [24]. The latter type of
IDS systems may employ anything from neural networks, Bayesian networks,
Markov chains/models, time series models, genetic algorithms, clustering,
3outlier detection and more [25, 24]. The end goal is to learn the properties
of an attack-free network traffic and then use the learned model to measure
distance of anomalous traffic from the normal traffic. More novel approaches
include artificial immune systems [26], which attempt to overcome anomalies
in a similar way as a human body does.
To join the fields of anomaly detection and network science, we look
into the dynamics of the network representing the use of computer-network
protocols. The word ”dynamics” points to the evolution of interactions over
a period of time and is the opposite of the word ”static”, which represents
most network representations. In the recent years, the standard network
representation has been revisited. Researchers have discovered that in some
cases it fails to adequately capture dynamics in the network, resulting from
time-dependent processes. Specifically, it has been discovered that transition
probabilities in the network are affected by the increase in the memory size
of the Markov chain (higher-order chains), which represents the network
dynamics [6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
The goal of our work is to provide insights into how computer network pro-
tocols are used by the endpoints in the network and how different protocols
interact. We devise a procedure to detect anomalies in protocol traffic with
the hope of detecting network attacks as well as uncommon traffic patterns.
We highlight the importance of taking into account higher-order dynamics
and its effects on model accuracy.
Chapter 2
Higher-order dependencies
Traditional network analysis methods use a network representation to cap-
ture the topology and interactions of entities in question. A set of nodes
corresponding to entities is identified and a relation between entities is es-
tablished. Two entities are in a relation, or linked, if there was an interaction
between these two entities. A missing link implies no interaction. By asso-
ciating transition probabilities with links, the network can be viewed upon
as a Markov chain. Markov chain models the dynamic processes occurring
in the real world, e.g. users moving between web pages using hyperlinks or
passengers flying between different cities. Markov chains satisfy the Markov
property. Considering a random walker in the network, who uses links to
move between nodes, the probability of the next visited node depends solely
on the current location of the walker. More formally, let the stochastic vari-
able Xt denote the location of the random walker at time t ∈ [0, T ]. The
location of the random walker in the future Xt+1 is given by a probability
distribution:
Pr(Xt+1 = xt+1 | Xt = xt, Xt−1 = xt−1, . . . , X0 = x0) =
Pr(Xt+1 = xt+1 | Xt = xt)
(2.1)
The standard network representation implicitly assumes Markov chains
with Markov property. Only recent research has given us insight that such
4
5representation can be severely misleading and inacurate [10, 9, 6, 27, 28].
Consider a simple example in Table 2.1. The network representation most
used is represented by the graph in Figure 2.1. To construct such a network,
we identify all the nodes and then link a pair of nodes, if at least one interac-
tion took place between those nodes in the entire dataset. Furthermore, we
can assign weights to links, by summing the number of interactions between
node pairs in the dataset.
1. D → A 7. B → B
2. A → B 8. D → A
3. B → B 9. A → C
4. D → A 10. A → C
5. A → B 11. C → D
6. B → B 12. A → C
Table 2.1: A simple example dataset of entities and their interactions.
A B
C D
2
3
3
1
3
Figure 2.1: Constructed network representation for the dataset in Table
2.1. Note that the edges are weighted, according to the number of times an
interaction took place between node pairs.
A random walker starting in node D, arrives to node A with Pr(Xt+1 =
A | Xt = D) = 1, following from the relative frequencies of outgoing link
weights at node D. Continuing at node A, the random walker will choose
to move to node B with probability 0.4 and to node C with probability 0.6,
according to relative frequencies of outgoing link weights at node A. However,
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if we look closely at the dataset in Table 2.1, specifically at paths of length
larger than one, we notice that the pattern D → A → B is predominant.
The consequence of this specific pattern is the fact that the random walker
is more likely to move to node B than to node C, if it has arrived to node
A from node D. The network representation in Figure 2.1 is inadequate,
predicting that the random walker will most likely move to node C from
node A, whereas in reality, this depends on how the random walker came to
node A in the first place.
First-order networks, such as the one in Figure 2.1, work with the as-
sumption that paths of length larger than one are transitive. For example,
the two links in the network, (C,D) and (D,A) imply there is a relation-
ship between C and A. In reality, however, whether a relationship between
C and A exists, depends on the ordering of links. Notice from Table 2.1,
that the link (D,A) occurs before link (C,D), invalidating the transitivity
assumption. An important observation is, that the ordering of links affects
causality [27]. Traditional network construction discards ordering of interac-
tions, invalidating the transitivity assumption, which most network analysis
methods rely on.
Regardless of the fact that the dataset in Table 2.1 is merely a toy ex-
ample, the Markov property of Markov chains implicitly modeled by tradi-
tional network representations may lead to misleading results on real world
datasets, as the patterns in longer node sequences are ignored and the transi-
tivity assumptions invalidated. Increasing the memory of the random walker,
by capturing longer sequences of past node visitations, leads to higher-order
Markov chains.
2.1 Higher-order networks
Scholtes [9] presents a general framework for modeling higher-order Markov
chains. Higher-order networks are most frequently used when the input is
sequential data, a sequence of node visitations or, alternatively, a multi-set
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of paths observed. The main idea of a higher-order network of order k > 1
is that the amount of memory a random walker stores (amount of previously
visited nodes) is equal to k:
Pr(Xt+1 = xt+1 | Xt = xt, Xt−1 = xt−1, . . . , X0 = x0) =
Pr(Xt+1 = xt+1 | Xt = xt, . . . , Xt−k+1 = xt−k+1)
(2.2)
Each node in a higher-order graph G(k) is a higher-order state node, which
contains k previously visited locations. Links between such higher-order state
nodes denote a shift of node visitation history by one node forward. Let us
look at an example of higher-order network construction for k = 2, given the
following multi-set S of paths:
S = { (D → A → B → B), (D → A → B → B → B),
(D → A → C), (A → C → D), (A → C) }
Nodes in G(2) correspond to paths of length one, in contrast to a tra-
ditional first-order network, where nodes correspond to single vertices (al-
ternatively paths of length zero). Identifying all distinct subpaths of length
one given paths in S yields our set of nodes in G(2). Adding links between
successive subpaths of length one, yields our set of interactions. Again, the
transition probabilities can be approximated using relative frequencies of
outgoing links at a specific node. For example, Pr(B | D,A) = 2
3
as there
are exactly two paths (D → A → B), while in total there are three paths
(D → A → x), where x is any location. The resulting network represented
by graph G(2) is visible in Figure 2.2.
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C – D
A – C
D – A
A – B
B – B
1
1
3
2
3
1
1
Figure 2.2: A higher-order network represented by a graph with higher-
order nodes. Each higher-order node is a memory node with memory size
of k = 2. Links between higher-order nodes indicate shifts in observation
history by one node forward.
The traditional first-order networks are simply a special case of construct-
ing a higher-order network by setting k = 1, obtaining graph from Figure
2.1. Furthermore, the dataset in Table 2.1 can be obtained by extracting all
subpaths of length one from our multi-set of paths S.
It is important to note the distinction between state or memory nodes
and actual locations. For instance, in Figure 2.2, node A − B is a state
node, indicating that the random walker arrived to location B from location
A. The actual location associated with state node A − B is therefore B.
Every location may have multiple associated state nodes, e.g. location B is
associated with state nodes A − B and B − B. While first-order networks
capture topological dimension of the data, as every node corresponds to
an actual location, the higher-order networks capture correlations in larger
sequences of paths, modeling the dynamics that occur in a network [9].
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2.2 Variable-order networks
How do we choose k, the amount of memory of the higher-order network, so
that the representation of the underlying dynamic processes is accurate, while
keeping the complexity of our model low? It is well known that a higher-order
model with order k may underfit the data, while a higher-order model with
order k + 1 may already overfit the data [6]. As a result, a lot of research is
conducted on the so-called variable-order networks, where a single model can
contain state nodes with variable memory up to a maximum memory of K.
This allows for more flexibility in modeling the dynamic processes, increasing
accuracy of the model, while keeping the degrees of freedom of a model
relatively manageable. Higher-order Markov chains suffer from the curse of
dimensionality as, according to Persson et al. [6], their number of parameters
requires exponentially increasing sizes of data to prevent overfitting. For a
k-th order model, the adjacency matrix of a higher-order directed graph G(k)
contains |V |k+1 transition probabilities which need to be estimated, where
V is the set of locations (paths of length zero, ordinary nodes). Because the
rows of such adjacency matrix need to sum to one, the total number of free
parameters is |V |k+1 − |V | (we can obtain the final transition probabilities
by subtracting the rest from one). This follows from the fact that only the
transitions which shift the observation history forward by one location are
allowed.
There exist several approaches for constructing a variable-order network.
For example, Scholtes [9] defines a so-called multi-order model MK , which
consists of individual higher-order models of orders k = 0, 1, . . . , K. The
probability of generating a path (v0 → . . . → vl) with the model MK is
defined as the product of transition probabilities of subpaths with increasing
order k = 0, 1, . . . , K, while also taking into account that the length of path
l may be larger than the maximum order of the model K. For instance, the
probability of M3 generating the path (a→ b→ c→ d→ e) is equal to:
10 CHAPTER 2. HIGHER-ORDER DEPENDENCIES
Pr(a, b, c, d, e) = Pr(a) · Pr(b | a) · Pr(c | a, b)·
Pr(d | a, b, c) · Pr(e | b, c, d)
(2.3)
A model of order k = 0 can be viewed upon as specifying prior prob-
abilities of the random walker starting it’s walk in each of the locations.
Scholtes then suggests a likelihood ratio optimization procedure to deter-
mine the optimal K value of a multi-order model MK . First, a likelihood
function L(MK | S) is defined based on the product of probabilities of all
paths in S. Then, choosing a model MK+1 in favor of a simpler model MK
depends on whether the likelihood of the former is significantly higher than
the likelihood of the latter model. As soon as this is no longer the case, the
optimal order Kopt has been found.
Xu et al. [10] provide an even more compact representation of a variable-
order Markov chain by storing in the variable-order network only the state
nodes corresponding to higher-order correlations found in the data, rather
than considering all possible transition probabilities between higher-order
nodes. Using their approach, the parameter explosion resulting from |V |k+1−
|V | transition probabilities is eliminated, as only the statistically significant
higher-order correlations are considered. Their variable-order construction
algorithm bears some similarity to the Apriori algorithm [29], used for mining
frequent item sets. In the first stage of their algorithm, a set of rules corre-
sponding to higher-order patterns is extracted from the sequential data. The
algorithm starts out with first-order dependencies (paths of length one) and
then attempts to extend them to higher correlation orders, up to a maximum
order K. If the memory increase of a state node significantly alters outgoing
transition probabilities compared to the outgoing probability distribution of
the original state node, a higher-order rule is justified. The minimum rule
support parameter allows the authors to control the compactness of the re-
sulting variable-order network and to prevent overfitting. A low minimum
support allows the algorithm to identify a large set of rules, even if the rules
are insignificant, fitting the model to noise in the data. A higher minimum
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support identifies only rules that occur frequently, preventing overfitting.
In the second stage, the extracted rules are used to create a variable-order
network representation, which encompasses both state/memory nodes and
physical/location nodes.
Persson et al. [6] view the dynamics of the network — higher-order cor-
relations — as flows of information. They start out with one state node for
every location and then ”unlump” the state nodes, producing more and more
state nodes for every location, according to the largest decrease in entropy
rate. Once a sufficient number of state nodes is reached, links are added
among these nodes. Such sparse Markov chains have a strictly decreasing
entropy rate with increasing numbers of higher-order nodes. An optimal
Markov chain is selected using model selection techniques.
2.3 Temporal dimension
As we have seen in the previous sections, dynamic processes on a network are
based on the ordering of interactions between entities. However, the dynamic
processes evolve at certain time scales, which are usually much shorter than
the observation period, during which the dataset was sampled [9]. Addi-
tional temporal dimension, which assigns timing information to interactions,
can alter the ordering of these interactions, causing different higher-order cor-
relations. Scholtes et al. provide an in-depth overview of temporal networks
[27], which we summarize here. In a temporal network, each interaction is a
tuple (A,B, t), where A and B are entities in interaction, while t ∈ [0, T ] is a
discrete timestamp denoting the time at which the interaction took place. A
time-respecting path is a sequence of interactions, with increasing timestamps,
i.e. (A,B, t1), (B,C, t2), (C,D, t3), . . . , (X,Z, tn); t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn. The
requirement of increasing timestamps causes an ordering of the links, one
that may be different from the implicit ordering provided by sequential order
of interactions in the dataset. Scholtes [9] in his later work demonstrates,
that the temporal dimension merely affects the ordering of the interactions
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and that no change is required to the higher-order Markov chain framework.
The input is still a multi-set of paths, albeit with a different ordering of nodes
in paths, due to timestamps.
However, the timing information of interactions allows us to observe dy-
namic processes at different time scales. This can be achieved through the
notion of maximum time difference δ for time-respecting paths [27]. A time-
respecting path (vo, v1, t1), . . . , (vl−1, vl, tl) conforms to a maximum time
difference δ if and only if 0 < ti+1 − ti ≤ δ, i = 0, . . . , l. In other words, a
time-respecting path with maximum time difference δ consists of only inter-
actions that are maximum δ time apart. Choosing δ is equivalent to filtering
out paths in the multi-set of paths S. A small value of δ will only keep the
paths that capture dynamic processes at small time scales, while choosing a
large value of δ will filter less, preserving most of the paths found in the data,
including those that occur over large periods of time. The optimal choice of
value for δ is a difficult problem in itself. Scholtes suggests approximating δ
using inter-interaction time distribution [9].
The following set of timestamped interactions better demonstrates the
role of δ parameter:
A
1−→ C, C 2−→ E, B 4−→ C, C 5−→ D, B 7−→ C, C 15−→ E
Using δ = 1 filters out the paths A
1−→ C 5−→ D and B 7−→ C 15−→ E, using
δ = 4 filters out only the path B
7−→ C 15−→ E, while using δ = ∞ preserves
all the paths.
A more subtle approach to encoding temporal information is by consid-
ering conditional waiting times, proposed by Matamalas et al. [28]. Take
for instance a path A → A → A → B → B → B → B. The variable-order
Markov models in the previous sections fail to account for the amount of time
spent in every physical location node. One of the reasons for this is that the
higher-order rules that would capture such patterns have insufficient support
and are pruned. Other reasons include an insufficient maximum allowed
memory size K of a model. A common solution is to reduce the sequence of
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node visitations to unique entries only, i.e. to convert the above path into
A→ B. This however discards the temporal information implicitly provided
by the number of successive location nodes.
The conditional waiting time of a node encodes additional information
on how long is a random walker likely to spend at a particular location,
given the previous steps the walker took. This is important in domains
such as disease spreading or information diffusion. Failing to account for
conditional waiting times could lead to poor predictions on the speed of
diffusion processes occurring in the network [28].
Matamalas et al. propose a solution to this problem called adaptive mem-
ory. The core idea of this approach is to allow additional entries in the full
transition matrix of a higher-order Markov chain, while generating subpaths
by skipping successive nodes corresponding to the same location. It is best
to take a look at an example. Taking the path A → A → A → B → B →
B → B and a fixed-order Markov model with k = 2, the adaptive memory
approach would generate the following subpaths, which are later converted
to higher-order nodes:
A→ A→ A,
A→ A→ B,
A→ B → B,
A@B → B → B,
A@B@B → B → B
Because of the limited memory of k = 2, previous location A would
have been lost upon reaching the subpath B → B → B → B. Forcing
the previous location to remain as the first node in the higher-order pattern
allows for better predictions, while the conditional waiting time is reflected
in the cardinality of the pattern, namely pattern A → B → B which now
occurs three times in total.
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In terms of transition matrices, the above approach allows for additional
transitions not allowed in higher-order Markov chains. A transition of (A−
B)→ (A−B) for example is not allowed in the transition matrix of a higher-
order Markov chain, as the node visitation history is not shifted by one node
forward, while this is perfectly acceptable in adaptive memory approach.
Chapter 3
Significant pattern detection
Chapter 2 revealed that in general, modeling higher-order dependencies of
increasing order results in a combinatorial explosion. With n = 10 first-order
nodes (physical locations), there are 102 = 100 possible second-order rules,
103 = 1000 third-order rules, etc., describing the dynamics of a network. To
mitigate the issue, variable-order models are used which encode higher-order
dependencies of various orders, specifically those found in the data. However,
even a variable-order model encodes a substantial amount of higher-order
patterns as it captures both the noise in the data and the important patterns.
In order to obtain interesting information from the data, we desire to filter
out higher-order dependencies and find only the statistically significant ones.
This enables us to observe which node visitation histories significantly affect
the transitions of the random walker. We seek a way to sort higher-order
patterns according to their importance.
The variable-order model proposed by Scholtes [9] does not allow for in-
dividual higher-order rule discovery, but tests the whole model Mk+1 versus
Mk. Such approach gives limited information on which specific higher-order
rules are significant, i.e. not produced by noise in the data. A good initial
proposal is that of Xu et al. [10], who use the Kullback-Leibler divergence
measure [30] to detect significant deviations in the outgoing probability distri-
butions caused by increased history size. Every state node in a variable-order
15
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network has an outgoing probability distribution associated with it, as the
next location depends on the transition probabilities given the current his-
tory. For instance, the state node A−B−C may have the following outgoing
probability distribution p:
(A−B − C)→ A : 0.12
(A−B − C)→ C : 0.49
(A−B − C)→ D : 0.39
Xu et al. detect significant higher-order patterns by increasing the history
size of a specific pattern, then measuring whether there is a significant change
in the outgoing probability distributions, comparing the previous and the new
distributions. Increasing the history of pattern (A,B,C), e.g. could alter the
transition probabilities, producing the altered probability distribution q:
(D − A−B − C)→ A : 0.11
(D − A−B − C)→ C : 0.33
(D − A−B − C)→ D : 0.56
The Kullback-Leibler divergence DKL(p, q) measures the expected loss of
information when approximating probability distribution p with distribution
q and is defined as the expectation of the log difference between probabilities
of two discrete distributions:
DKL(p, q) =
∑
i
p(xi) · log p(xi)
q(xi)
Xu et al. [10] find the altered probability distribution q significant, if
DKL(p, q) >
Order(q)
log2(Support(q))
,
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whereOrder(q) = 4 is the history size of higher-order rules, while Support(q)
denotes the number of occurrences of a particular state node. The assump-
tion of such approach is that patterns of high order are less likely, while the
patterns which have high support (occur frequently in the data) are more
likely.
Such approach also does not allow for individual higher-order rule testing,
as entire outgoing probability distributions are compared. If, for example,
q was found to be significantly different than p, then all the higher-order
rules in q would be deemed significant, even though it is clear that pattern
(D − A− B − C − A) is not significant since adding node D does not alter
the transition probability much (0.12 versus 0.11).
Instead we use a different procedure, which relies on hypothesis testing.
We use the variable-order model MK proposed by Scholtes [9], which encodes
all higher-order patterns up to maximum order K. The probability of MK
generating a specific pattern generalizes from example (2.3), but we skip the
prior probability of a random walker starting in specific node (k > 0):
Pr(v1, v2, . . . , vl) = Pr(v2 | v1) · Pr(v3 | v1, v2) · . . . · Pr(vi | vi−K+1, . . . , vi−1)
·Pr(vi+1 | vi−K+2, . . . , vi) · . . . · Pr(vl | vl−K+1, . . . , vl−1)
(3.1)
The intuition behind our approach is that if a higher-order pattern (v0, v1, . . . , vK)
of order K is significant, then it should be predicted well by the model MK
(pattern is in accordance with the model), but predicted poorly by a model
which uses less history, MK−1. If the pattern is predicted poorly by both
MK and MK−1 then this is a result of either an anomaly in the data, inad-
equate amount of training data for our model or the result of limitations in
the model itself.
In order to test how well is a pattern predicted by the model MK , we
use hypothesis testing procedure. Assume again a pattern (v0, v1, . . . , vK)
of length K for simplicity. The model MK outputs the total probability pm
of generating this pattern, according to equation (3.1). The resulting value
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states the probability of obtaining this pattern, if a random walk starting in
node v0 of length exactly K was made in a traditional, first-order network.
The length of the random walk denotes the amount of visited locations in
the first-order network including v0. In comparison with the model, we also
have an empirical value for probability of the pattern. Let r denote the total
number occurrences of pattern (v0, v1, . . . , vK) and let n denote the total
number of subpaths of size K starting in v0. The empirical probability is
simply a relative frequency pe =
r
n
, according to the data.
How well a model predicts the pattern depends on how similar are both
probabilities pm and pe. Because consecutive random walks in the network
are independent, the total number of occurrences of (v0, v1, . . . , vK) follows
a binomial distribution with parameters pm and n. We use a two-tailed
binomial test to assert whether pm deviates significantly from pe:
H0 : pe = pm
H1 : pe 6= pm
Rejecting the null hypothesis tells us that the pattern cannot be predicted
well by MK . Using a two-tailed test allows us to check if a pattern is either
over- or under-represented in MK . Because with large values of parameter
n the binomial test breaks down due to increasing complexity of having to
calculate the cumulative distribution function involving factorials, we replace
the binomial test with a two-tailed z-test, i.e. we approximate the binomial
distribution with the standard normal distribution. This follows from the
central limit theorem, as the normal approximation is accurate for large
values of n. The test statistic becomes:
z =
|pe − pm|√
pˆ(1− pˆ) · 2/n (3.2)
where
pˆ =
n · pe + n · pm
2n
=
pe + pm
2
(3.3)
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The p-value is then calculated as 1 − ncdf(z) + ncdf(−z), where ncdf
is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. We reject the null
hypothesis H0 if p-value is below a specified significance threshold α. The
entire procedure can be iteratively expanded to test patterns of increasing
order K, while the model MK is updated with significant patterns as we
proceed.
Algorithm 1 Significant pattern detection algorithm
Require: multiset of paths S, maximum order K, significance threshold α
Ensure: list of significant patterns
initialize rules to an empty array
for k = 2 to K do
Sk = all subpaths of length k from S
for all (v0, v1, . . . , vk) ∈ Sk do
r = total number of occurrences of (v0, v1, . . . , vk)
n = total number of p ∈ Sk, which start with v0
pe =
r
n
pMk = probability of (v1, v2, . . . , vk) according to Mk
pMk−1 = probability of (v1, v2, . . . , vk) according to Mk−1
zk = ztest(pe, pMk , n) according to (3.2)
zk−1 = ztest(pe, pMk−1 , n) according to (3.2)
if p-value of zk−1 ≤ α and p-value of zk > α then
add ((v0, v1, . . . , vk), p-value of zk−1) to rules array
end if
end for
end for
sort rules according to increasing p-values
return rules
Algorithm 1 has an added advantage of returning a sorted list of signif-
icant patterns according to increasing p-values. The lower the p-value, the
more certain we are in rejecting H0 and accepting a pattern as significant.
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3.1 Artificial data
We now test the procedure described in Algorithm 1 on generated, artificial
trajectories. We use a simple directed graph represented by a square n × n
grid as the basis for the random walks, which generate the trajectories to be
used as input.
1 2 . . . n
. . . . . . . . . 2n
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . n2
Figure 3.1: A directed graph represented by a square n× n grid.
We use the directed graph presented in Figure 3.1 to perform 10 000
random walks, each of length K + 10, based on a model giving transition
probabilities. With the model we can define a set of higher-order dependen-
cies by altering the transition probabilities based on specific history of visited
nodes.
We focus first on n = 2, i.e. a 2 × 2 square grid, and use a model with
two second-order dependencies, with no other higher-order dependencies, as
visible in (3.4).
1 2
3 4
Figure 3.2: A 2× 2 grid with two second-order dependencies.
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1→ 2 : 0.5 1→ 3 : 0.5
2→ 1 : 0.5 2→ 4 : 0.5
3→ 1 : 0.5 3→ 4 : 0.5
4→ 2 : 0.5 4→ 3 : 0.5
(2, 1)→ 2 : 0.1 (2, 1)→ 3 : 0.9
(4, 2)→ 1 : 0.1 (4, 2)→ 4 : 0.9
(3.4)
Table 3.1 shows the returned significant patterns by running Algorithm 1.
The results are based on a search for up to fifth order patterns (K = 5). As
it is clearly seen, the algorithm correctly identified that there are no patterns
of order higher than two. Furthermore, the second-order patterns (4, 2, 1)
and (2, 1, 2), which are under-represented in the model (3.4), have the lowest
p-value, while the patterns which are over-represented in the model, (2, 1, 3)
and (4, 2, 4), are also in the list of significant patterns.
It is interesting to explore why did the model find patterns (1, 2, 1) and
(1, 2, 4) significant, as they were not specifically encoded in the model (3.4).
If we break up the patterns into the probability product predicted by the
model M1 (according to equation (3.1)), we find the following probabilities:
Pr(1, 2, 1) = Pr(2 | 1) · Pr(1 | 2) and Pr(1, 2, 4) = Pr(2 | 1) · Pr(4 | 2).
From model (3.4), we find that Pr(1 | 2) = 0.5. However, in the empirical
probabilities calculated from the generated trajectories, we find that Pr(1 |
2) = 0.4, causing a difference in probabilities, a low p-value and therefore the
rule is marked as significant. The reason for such deviation from the model
is the higher-order dependency rule (2, 1) → 2 : 0.1 encoded in the model,
which causes the random walker to use the first-order connection 1 → 2
much less than it normally would. It is apparent that higher-order rules
affect lower-order rules as well.
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Pattern p-value
(4, 2, 1) 1.01 · 10−282
(2, 1, 2) 7.75 · 10−261
(1, 2, 1) 8.17 · 10−166
(1, 2, 4) 1.40 · 10−117
(2, 1, 3) 2.42 · 10−109
(4, 2, 4) 4.89 · 10−100
(3, 1, 2) 1.84 · 10−58
(3, 1, 3) 3.61 · 10−51
Table 3.1: A list of significant patterns and their p-values, returned by
Algorithm 1, with K = 5, α = 0.01 and 10 000 generated trajectories based
on model (3.4) and a 2× 2 grid from Figure 3.2.
We now look at a second example, a model with a single fifth-order de-
pendency, as given in (3.5), with the same 2× 2 grid as in Figure 3.2. Table
3.2 shows how p-values of pattern are increasing with increasing history size,
as anticipated. Model M1 has the lowest p-value as it has the lowest his-
tory size and is unable to account for higher-order correlations. Model M4
still falls short of the α = 0.01 significance level, as the lack of fifth node in
observation history critically affects the transition probabilities.
1→ 2 : 0.5 1→ 3 : 0.5
2→ 1 : 0.5 2→ 4 : 0.5
3→ 1 : 0.5 3→ 4 : 0.5
4→ 2 : 0.5 4→ 3 : 0.5
(3, 1, 3, 1, 2)→ 1 : 0.1 (3, 1, 3, 1, 2)→ 4 : 0.9
(3.5)
From this example it is evident that higher-order dependencies affect the
significance of lower-order dependencies as well. Algorithm 1 finds patterns
(1, 3, 1, 2, 4), (3, 1, 2, 4) and (1, 2, 4) significant in addition to the fifth-order
pattern (3, 1, 3, 1, 2, 4). Notice how the lower-order patterns are suffixes of
the original fifth-order pattern. The reason for lower-order patterns being
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significant in addition to the fifth-order pattern is the final transition 2→ 4,
which has an extreme transition probability of 0.9 according to the model
(3.5), in the fifth-order rule. This extreme probability affects the transitions
of the random walker and because all suffixes of the pattern (3, 1, 3, 1, 2, 4)
also take into account the transition 2→ 4, they are found significant. If, for
instance, we change the transition probabilities of the model (3.5), so that
(3, 1, 3, 1, 2)→ 1 : 0.3 and (3, 1, 3, 1, 2)→ 4 : 0.7, Algorithm 1 no longer finds
lower-order patterns (3, 1, 2, 4) and (1, 2, 4) significant, because the fifth-order
dependency no longer has a drastic effect.
Model p-value of (3, 1, 3, 1, 2, 4)
M1 4.81 · 10−39
M2 6.12 · 10−34
M3 8.89 · 10−28
M4 1.68 · 10−13
M5 0.9588
Table 3.2: The increasing p-values of models with increasing memory size,
up to the size of pattern, K = 5. Based on model (3.5) and a 2 × 2 square
grid from Figure 3.2.
3.2 Anomaly detection
The procedure described in Algorithm 1 can be looked upon as the training
phase, in which we fit a variable-order model MK of maximum order K to the
trajectory data. The added bonus of the training phase is the identification
of higher-order patterns that significantly affect the transition probabilities.
But what if we are given a new set of trajectories, namely a testing set of
data and are asked what patterns are poorly predicted by the current model
MK? Such questions are common in anomaly detection, where a model is
first trained on a large set of training data, to capture the most common
traffic patterns, and is then given an alternative data which may contain
24 CHAPTER 3. SIGNIFICANT PATTERN DETECTION
patterns of different frequencies, resulting in an anomaly.
The anomaly detection procedure is quite simple and similar to that of
Algorithm 1. We again perform statistical testing if the empirical probability
of specific pattern deviates significantly from probability predicted by the
model, which in-turn depends on the training phase. The entire procedure
is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Anomaly detection algorithm
Require: testing set of paths Stest, model MK from the training phase,
significance threshold α
Ensure: list of significant patterns, i.e. anomalies
initialize anomalies to an empty array
for k = 2 to K do
Sk = all subpaths of length k from Stest
for all (v0, v1, . . . , vk) ∈ Sk do
r = total number of occurrences of (v0, v1, . . . , vk)
n = total number of p ∈ Sk, which start with v0
pe =
r
n
pMK = probability of (v1, v2, . . . , vk) according to MK
z = ztest(pe, pMK , n) according to (3.2)
if p-value of z ≤ α then
add ((v0, v1, . . . , vk), p-value of z) to anomalies array
end if
end for
end for
sort anomalies according to increasing p-values
return anomalies
We perform an experiment on two different models giving transition prob-
abilities for the random walker on a 2 × 2 grid from Figure 3.2. The first
model encodes a second-order rule of (2, 4) → 2 : 0.1 and (2, 4) → 3 : 0.9,
while the second model encodes a second-order rule of (1, 3) → 1 : 0.1 and
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(1, 3)→ 4 : 0.9. We use both models to produce 10 000 trajectories of size 12
each. We use the first 10 000 trajectories from the first model as the training
set and the second 10 000 trajectories from the second model as the testing
set.
Anomaly p-value
(1, 3, 4) 0.0
(2, 4, 2) 0.0
(2, 4, 3) 0.0
(1, 3, 1) 0.0
(4, 2, 4) 2.37 · 10−138
(3, 1, 2) 1.24 · 10−123
(4, 2, 1) 1.13 · 10−121
(4, 3, 4) 4.05 · 10−109
(3, 1, 3) 1.00 · 10−106
(4, 3, 1) 5.97 · 10−101
(3, 4, 3) 5.66 · 10−99
(3, 4, 2) 1.24 · 10−88
Table 3.3: A list of anomalies and their p-values, returned by Algorithm 2,
with K = 2 and α = 0.01.
Table 3.3 displays the resulting anomalies found by Algorithm 2. As ex-
pected, patterns (1, 3, 4) and (1, 3, 1) are anomalies because they are encoded
in the second model used to generate testing data, while patterns (2, 4, 2) and
(2, 4, 3) are also anomalies because they are not encoded in the second model
producing the testing data, but were present in the first model producing the
training data. Other anomalies are the direct result of the first four anoma-
lies, as the second-order patterns affect transition probabilities of first-order
patterns as well.
When using the training data as the testing data, no anomalies are found,
which is in accordance with our expectations.
Chapter 4
Computer communication
networks
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have defined higher-order dependencies, gave us
a way to find important dynamics in the vast datasets and are in theory
ready to be applied to any desirable sequence-like data for which we seek to
understand dynamics. However, in practice, we are often faced with addi-
tional problems such as noisy data, missing values, too much data or the the
dataset does not exhibit higher-order correlations at all. Before we dive into
computer network traces, it is vital to understand what we can expect from
such datasets. In this chapter, we review the basics behind the two most
used networking protocols to this day, and give an overview of the type of
dynamics that arise from computer communications.
Our choice of domain are computer networks, more specifically the packet
traces in the transport and application layers of the TCP/IP model. We fo-
cus on segments from the two most used protocols in the transport layer, the
Transfer Control Protocol (TCP) and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
Regardless of the protocol, the transport layer encapsulates traffic from the
application layer and provides a logical communication link between two
endpoints in a network. The link is termed logical because the underlying
network structure and topology, consisting of routers, switches and links, is
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abstracted away. Both endpoints communicate as if they were connected di-
rectly, ignoring the details of the lower network layers in the TCP/IP model.
The fundamental task of the transport layer is to extend the host-to-host
communication, which the network layer (along with the IP protocol) pro-
vides, to process-to-process communication of the processes running on in-
dividual hosts [31]. An additional task of the transport layer protocols is
to perform multiplexing and demultiplexing operations, forwarding messages
from a single network interface to different processes and vice-versa. This is
achieved through the use of a 16-bit identifier called port or socket number,
assigned to each of the running processes. The first 1024 port numbers are
reserved and termed well-known port numbers. Although all transport layer
data traces contain only TCP and UDP segments, it is possible to determine
the application layer protocol encapsulated in the segment simply by observ-
ing well-known port numbers. For instance, the port number 80 corresponds
to the HTTP protocol. With port numbers larger than 1023 the application
layer protocol can no longer be reliably determined.
Whereas the transport layer provides a logical communication link be-
tween processes running on individual hosts, the network layer provides a
logical communication link between individual hosts in the global network
structure, abstracting away the switches and physical links that connect the
hosts. The IP protocol, which assigns a unique 32-bit identifier to each host
termed the IP number (for simplicity, we focus specifically on the IPv4 proto-
col), allows for addressing of devices in the network structure (either local or
global). Thus, a network trace that is captured at one of the hosts in the net-
work is expected to have at least the following attributes: source IP address,
source port number, destination IP address and destination port number.
The source identifiers are necessary for bidirectional communication.
Figure 4.1 depicts the complexity that naturally arises from the layered
architecture of computer communication networks. There are several vari-
ables to consider for a network trace dataset, before attempting to use net-
work analysis and higher-order methods. From the network layer perspec-
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tive, an important consideration is where the tracing program was placed,
i.e. on which host (IP address). For example, we can monitor the intra-
network communication (communication between hosts 123.218.44.78 and
123.218.44.209 in Figure 4.1), the inter-network communication (commu-
nication between hosts 123.281.44.5 and 46.164.13.66 in Figure 4.1) or
both. Most datasets we have tested are the result of a trace being run on
the edge router between the sub-network and the rest of the Internet (inter-
network communication). Such traces are also the most interesting, as the
majority of application protocols run across the Internet rather than in sub-
networks (e-mail and web pages). Such traces also make the most sense, as
network attacks most frequently originate from outside the sub-network.
Figure 4.1: An example of a computer network architecture, depicting the
process-to-process communication, while also outlining the significance of IP
addresses. The sub-network uses public IP addresses, ignoring details such
as network address translation (NAT), to keep complexity to a minimum.
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A second variable to consider is how to interpret the network trace data
from the network analysis standpoint, i.e. what would be the nodes in the
network and what the relations between those nodes. We found the follow-
ing interpretation satisfactory. A node corresponds to a particular packet
destination in the dataset. Clients, or packet sources in the dataset, per-
form a walk in the network of such nodes, producing trajectories of packet
destinations (clients repeatedly choose different packet destinations to send
packets to). Two nodes are connected or in a relation, if any client used
them in succession (in a traditional, first-order network). The definition of
a node is intentionally vague, because a packet destination can be defined in
multiple ways. The simplest approach is to treat all destination IP addresses
as packet destinations and therefore nodes. Another approach is to use port
numbers, and thereby application layer protocols, as packet destinations, or
a combination of both. As the majority of publicly available datasets use
some form of IP address anonymization procedure and because the IP ad-
dress itself gives almost no valuable information on the type of traffic, we
decided to focus on port numbers and protocols instead. Using a combina-
tion of IP address and destination port is also an option, but is problematic,
because there is little overlap in the destination IPs used by different clients.
Clients are likely to use their own set of destination IP addresses that does
not overlap with other clients, e.g. every website is hosted on a web server
with it’s own IP address and every client is more likely to browse it’s own
unique set of web sites. Even a single website can have multiple associated IP
addresses to help with load balancing. Completely disregarding IP addresses
however, is also not an option, because they do provide one important piece
of information. Observing two consecutive connections of one client allows
us to detect whether a destination host has changed or remained the same.
In our final implementation, we use the information from two consecutive IP
address identifiers and append it to the protocol/port number identifier. If a
protocol was used on the same host it is marked as protocol*, while if the
destination IP address was changed, no * identifier is present.
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To better illustrate our choice of node and relation interpretation, con-
sider the following example dataset in Table 4.1, which is a subset of TCP
traffic trace between the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and the rest of the
world [32]. In this example, packet sources or clients can be either the Source
IP idenfitier or a combination of (Source IP, Source port) identifiers. We
have found the Source IP identifier as the packet source to be adequate, as
otherwise the trajectories are broken up into much smaller paths. The packet
sources themselves are merely random walkers and are not translated into a
network representation.
Source IP Source Port Destination IP Destination Port
45 1262 46 25
196 1852 197 23
120 1728 448 80
544 20 543 40583
45 25 140 1547
45 1399 705 25
544 20 543 41617
120 1766 121 25
120 1816 1026 25
45 1518 1170 25
45 1563 1277 25
45 25 1220 1284
196 25 170 3366
120 1997 1262 80
120 2031 1262 80
45 25 1 4664
Table 4.1: An example network trace dataset to illustrate different possible
interpretations of nodes and edges from a network analysis standpoint. IP
addresses have been anonymized and replaced with integer identifiers.
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Like previously mentioned, there are several options for packet destina-
tions or nodes in the first-order network. We group the dataset in Table 4.1
according to the packet source (Source IP column) and convert the packet
destinations of every packet source into a sequence-like data or trajectories.
The ordering of individual packet destinations within each trajectory depends
on the original ordering in the dataset, which may be arbitrarily changed by
permuting the rows of the dataset (or by sorting the dataset based on a
timestamp column). For example, the following trajectories are obtained if
we choose Destination port as our packet destination:
45: 25, 1547, 25, 25, 25, 1284, 4664
196: 23, 3366
120: 80, 25, 25, 80, 80
544: 40583, 41617
The trajectories can then be used to produce first-order and higher-order
graphs as well. An example of first-order graph is visible in Figure 4.2.
25
1284
4664
80
1547
23
3366
40583
41617
Figure 4.2: A first-order network constructed from example dataset in
Table 4.1 by using Destination port as packet destination.
Notice that using only Destination port column as the packet destina-
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tion leads to loss of information. Specifically, the sub-sequence 25, 80, 80
of packet source 120, corresponding to repeated use of HTTP protocol, does
not reveal if the protocol was used to communicate with one host or with
different hosts. By also taking into account the Destination IP column, an
alternative set of trajectories is obtained, one that allows us to observe if the
hosts have changed (* marks same hosts):
45: 25, 1547, 25, 25, 25, 1284, 4664
196: 23, 3366
120: 80, 25, 25, 80, 80*
544: 40583, 41617*
Rarely are we provided with a ready-to-use dataset such as the one in
Table 4.1. TCP protocol, for instance, segments the data and sends it in
chunks during a single session. Furthermore, every received segment must be
acknowledged, resulting in an overflow of packets that have to be analyzed.
As a result, raw TCP trace data contains all packets, both those used to ini-
tiate a session and those used during the session. We are of course interested
only in successive protocols being used, so we keep only the packets related
to session initiation. UDP protocol has no such issue, as it sends the data
as-is (the application layer has to take care of segmentation). Specific quirks
in the application layer protocols are captured as dynamics, represented by
higher-order correlation. For instance, in Figure 4.1, clients 123.218.44.78
and 123.218.44.209 communicate using FTP protocol’s active mode, but
this is well captured by modeling dynamics, removing the need to handle
such edge cases manually.
Last but not least, we have to consider that the type of communication
network may not exhibit higher-order correlations at all. Such was the case
when we used our significance detection framework on anonymized internet
traces from CAIDA’s equinix-chicago monitor on high-speed Internet back-
bone links [11]. As the transport layer protocols are point-to-point logical
connections and because we opted for a network representation using destina-
tion port numbers as nodes, the presence of recurring paths of length larger
33
than one depends not only on where the traffic monitor is placed, but also on
how much overlap there is among different trajectories of packet sources. In
the case of CAIDA, the traffic monitor was placed on a high-speed backbone
link, causing not only an enormous amount of traffic, but also the type of
traffic was mostly forwarded packets. This resulted in an insignificant over-
lap between trajectories of different packet sources and consequentially no
higher-order correlations. If we are to have any hope of detecting higher-
order correlations in computer communication networks, we should focus on
consumer sub-networks, rather than on key architectural endpoints in the
global internet structure.
Chapter 5
Results
Chapter 4 outlined the type of datasets we are looking for within the do-
main of computer communication networks. We are interested in TCP and
UDP packet traces of consumer-oriented networks and we are looking for
data traces which were taken at a border router of the sub-network. We first
present our results of higher-order network analysis on a TCP trace provided
by Paxson [12]. The dataset contains a wide-area monthly trace of all TCP
packets between the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and the rest of the world.
The tracing program ran between September 16, 1993 through October 15,
1993. The dataset is quite old and not really representative of the current
dynamics in the global Internet structure. Back in 1993, internet commu-
nication was not yet widely spread and security did not yet pose an issue.
Consequentially, a lot of insecure protocols such as Telnet were widely used,
while more modern and secure protocols such as SSH were just emerging. A
lot of old protocols found in this dataset are nowadays obsolete, such as the
old Line Printer Daemon (LPD) protocol that was replaced by the Internet
Printing protocol (IPP) or the Gopher protocol superseded by the HTTP
protocol. Nonetheless, it is useful to analyze the significant higher-order
patterns found by our framework, as we know what to expect in terms of
dynamics for every protocol. However, in order to understand the dynamics
found by our framework, we first require specific knowledge of the domain.
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We therefore give a brief overview of the most used protocols of pre 2000 era
in Table 5.1.
Protocol (associated ports) Description
Telnet [33] (23) Remote terminal access. Used to connect to re-
mote hosts and run command line commands re-
motely. Uses no encryption by default.
X window system (6000-6063) Remote graphical user interface protocol. A
server controls the hardware (display, keyboard,
mouse), while clients connect to the server and
issue graphical commands such as displaying a
window, drawing on screen etc.
Finger [34] (79) Provides status report and user information shar-
ing of remote systems. The protocol was primar-
ily used to check online status of people on re-
mote machines and to exchange simple informa-
tion such as name and e-mail addresses.
Remote login [35] (513) Almost equal to Telnet protocol, allows users re-
mote terminal access. Unlike with Telnet, the
server can specify a list of trusted clients and
those clients require no authentication.
Internet Relay Chat [36] (194, 6667) Text chat based on client-server architecture. A
group of clients connect to a chat server to ex-
change text messages.
Gopher [37] (70) Known as the predecessor of the modern web, it
provided online access to documents using a hi-
erarchical directory structure.
Table 5.1: An overview of the most frequently used application-layer proto-
cols before the year 2000, as observed in Lawrence Berkeley traces [12]. Note
that all of the protocols use TCP as the underlying transport-layer protocol.
Some of these protocols are still widely used today.
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5.1 Berkeley data set
We now provide the results of higher-order pattern detection of maximum
order up to K = 5 on the Lawrence Berkeley TCP traces [12]. We list a few
most interesting higher-order patterns which were found to be significant, as
seen in Table 5.2.
Pattern Description
ftp, ftp-data*, ftp-data* In accordance with FTP protocol, where a control
connection is established first and then the data
connection takes place on the same host.
finger, smtp*, finger* Interesting because the client first used the Finger
protocol to obtain information from the remote
host, which is a SMTP server at the same time.
ftp, login*, ftp* The client started a FTP control session and also
used remote login procedure to access the remote
host.
login, login*, X11* The client first used remote login to access the
remote host and then established a X11 session to
run graphical programs on the remote host, most
likely piggybacking over existing login session.
printer, smtp, ftp A typical example of a client using all popular
services of the Internet at that time.
domain, domain, domain*,
domain
An example of DNS query where three different
DNS servers are involved. Interesting also because
DNS most usually operates using UDP as the un-
derlying transfer protocol.
smtp, printer, printer*,
printer*, printer*, smtp
A client which sends two e-mails and completes a
print-job on one remote host.
Table 5.2: Most interesting higher-order patterns which were found sig-
nificant while investigating Berkeley TCP traces [12] (α = 0.01). Protocols
marked with * identifier denote that the destination IP address remained the
same. The interpretation of these patterns is only hypothetical.
We also visualize the results using graphs. Because there are many pro-
tocols (physical nodes) in the dataset and because each protocol has two cor-
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responding nodes (indicating the same or different IP address), we restrict
ourselves to the following protocols: FTP, X11 and Telnet/Remote login.
Furthermore, we join both the FTP control and data connections (ports 20
and 21) into a single protocol and we treat Telnet and Remote login protocols
as one, due to their similarities. This greatly reduces the size of graphs we are
about to present (induced subgraphs of subset of nodes), while still outlines
the importance of higher-order dynamics. To further reduce the complexity
we opt for the following visualization technique. We visualize each higher-
order graph G(k) of order k as a first-order graph. We do this by producing
a set of first-order graphs, based on every history combination of size k. The
transition probabilities of these first-order graphs are determined according
to the specific node visitation history which the graph represents. For exam-
ple, for a second-order graph G(2) and three most used protocols, we have
five first-order graphs, G
(1)
FTP , G
(1)
Login and G
(1)
X11, each representing transition
probabilities for different node visitation histories. A third-order graph G(3)
would have eighteen first-order graphs G
(1)
FTP,FTP , G
(1)
FTP,FTP∗, G
(1)
FTP,Login etc.
Protocols used on the same remote host, i.e. marked with *, are not allowed
as the first element in node visitation history. Because the number of differ-
ent node visitation history combinations rises exponentially with increasing
order k, we keep only those first-order graphs, which contain a significant
higher-order pattern found in the previous step.
Figure 5.1 provides an overview of how dynamics change with the second-
order dependencies in comparison with the traditional first-order dynamics.
Graph in Figure 5.1(b) demonstrates how knowing that the previous used
protocol was FTP results in all transitions converging back to the FTP pro-
tocol, but on the same remote host (IP address). The packet source is much
more likely to use the FTP protocol again, coming from the Login and X11
protocols and, is now less likely to remain in these protocols (reduced weights
on self-loops). Furthermore, you are now more likely to remain using the FTP
protocol, as the weight on self-loop has been increased. A similar story can
be observed in graphs from Figure 5.1(c) and Figure 5.1(d), where know-
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ing the previously used protocol leads to repeated use of the protocol in the
future.
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login
login*ftp
X11*
ftp* X11
(a) Traditional, first-order graph G(1)
comprised of the three chosen proto-
cols. Each protocol has two nodes: one
corresponding to the use of same IP ad-
dress (*) and one corresponding to the
use of different IP address.
login
login*ftp
X11*
ftp* X11
(b) Graph G
(1)
FTP giving an overview
of how transition probabilities change
when we know that the previously used
protocol was FTP.
login
login*ftp
X11*
ftp* X11
(c) Graph G
(1)
Login giving an overview
of how transition probabilities change
when we know that the previously used
protocol was Remote login/Telnet.
login
login*ftp
X11*
ftp* X11
(d) Graph G
(1)
X11 giving an overview
of how transition probabilities change
when we know that the previously used
protocol was X11.
Figure 5.1: A comparison of the ordinary first-order graph G(1) versus the
first-order graphs based on specific node visitation history. Transition prob-
abilities are represented using edge widths, while edges marked in red denote
the patterns that were found to be significant according to our significance
detection framework (α = 0.01). To reduce the size of graphs, edges with
transition probability less than 0.05 were pruned. Full adjacency matrices
are visible in Figure A.1.
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We now turn our attention to third-order dependencies as depicted in
Figure 5.2. Comparing graphs in Figure 5.2(a) and Figure 5.2(b) tells us
that a sequence of protocols ftp, login*, login* is now more likely to
keep you using the Remote login/Telnet protocol on the same remote host.
Furthermore, the sequence ftp, login*, ftp is a lot less likely to use FTP
protocol on another remote host, as the hosts were just changed (reduced
self-loop weight on ftp node). Observing graphs in Figure 5.2(c) and Figure
5.2(d) demonstrates how the sequence login, X11*, login* is now most
likely to lead you to the repeated use of X11 protocol on the same remote host
(although the connection was not found to be significant). Then there are
lots of minor changes in transition probabilities, such as the added self-loops
on X11 and ftp nodes. The only significant edge states that you are less
likely to use the Remote login protocol but to continue using X11 protocol
on the same remote host.
The results are based on the characteristics of the traffic in Berkeley sub-
network back in 1995. As we demonstrate in the upcoming chapter, choosing
a different network with different traffic characteristics yields different higher-
order dependencies. We must emphasize here that first-order dynamics fail
to capture higher-order correlations, such as returning to the previously used
protocol. Overall we found 372 significant second-order, 311 third-order,
184 fourth-order and 126 fifth-order dependencies, based on 460 different
destination port numbers, which greatly affect the accuracy of the model.
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login
login*ftp
X11*
ftp* X11
(a) Graph G
(1)
FTP from Figure 5.1(b)
giving an overview of transition proba-
bilities, where the current history is the
FTP protocol.
login
login*ftp
X11*
ftp* X11
(b) Graph G
(1)
FTP,Login∗ giving an
overview of the next step in node visi-
tation history, where the Login proto-
col was used additionally to the FTP
protocol, on the same remote host.
login
login*ftp
X11*
ftp* X11
(c) Graph G
(1)
Login giving an overview of
transition probabilities, where the cur-
rent history is the Login protocol.
login
login*ftp
X11*
ftp* X11
(d) Graph G
(1)
Login,X11∗ giving an
overview of the next step in node
visitation history, where X11 protocol
was used additionally to the Login
protocol, on the same remote host.
Figure 5.2: A comparison of first-order graphs representing different node
visitation history of size one versus the first-order graphs of increased node
visitation history of size two. Transition probabilities are represented using
edge widths, while edges marked in red denote the patterns that were found to
be significant according to our significance detection framework (α = 0.01).
To reduce the size of graphs, edges with transition probability less than 0.05
were pruned. Full adjacency matrices are visible in Figure A.2.
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5.2 UCLA data set
We perform similar analysis on a more recent dataset. We use both TCP
and UDP traces collected on August 2001 at a border router of University of
California, Computer Science Department, Los Angeles (UCLA CSD) [13].
We use three traces out of ten available, producing approximately 4.3 million
connection records. The detection of higher-order dependencies of maximum
order K = 5 reveals many interesting dependencies, as listed in Table 5.3.
Pattern Description
domain, http, http* A classical example of DNS query which returns
the IP address of a web server, which is then
queried using HTTP protocol.
http, http*, domain An example of following a hyperlink on a web
site, which causes a DNS query to resolve the new
domain name.
http, https, https* An example of navigation from an insecure web
site to SSL secured web site.
pop3, pop3*, http Reading e-mails and browsing the web.
domain, ssh, ssh* SSH session with domain name resolution.
pop3, smtp, pop3 Interaction with an e-mail client to both send and
receive e-mails.
imap, http, http*, imap* Usage of IMAP protocol for e-mail management,
on the same remote host which also provides a
web server.
domain, domain*, domain*,
domain, domain*, http
A fifth-order dependency demonstrating a longer
DNS query chain.
Table 5.3: Most interesting higher-order patterns which were found signifi-
cant while investigating UCLA CSD traces [13] (α = 0.01). Protocols marked
with * identifier denote that the destination IP address remained the same.
The interpretation of these patterns is only hypothetical.
Figure 5.3 clearly demonstrates the failure of first-order modeling to cap-
ture the relationship between the DNS and HTTP protocols. Only a second-
order model is able to capture the interaction between both protocols, high-
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lighting the importance of higher-order dynamics.
domain
http*
domain*
http
(a) Traditional, first-order graph G(1)
comprised of the DNS and HTTP pro-
tocols. Each protocol has two nodes:
one corresponding to the use of same
IP address (*) and one corresponding
to the use of different IP address.
domain
http*
domain*
http
(b) Graph G
(1)
domain giving an overview
of how transition probabilities change
when we know that the previously used
protocol was DNS. Notice the failure of
the first-order graph from Figure 5.3(a)
to predict the connection between the
HTTP and DNS protocols.
Figure 5.3: A comparison of the ordinary first-order graph G(1) versus the
first-order graph based on DNS as the previously used protocol. Transition
probabilities are represented using edge widths, while edges marked in red
denote the patterns that were found to be significant according to our sig-
nificance detection framework (α = 0.01). To reduce the size of graphs,
edges with transition probability less than 0.01 were pruned. Full adjacency
matrices are visible in Figure A.3.
The UCLA CSD traces also contain a simulated attack scenario. The
simulated attack was a UDP flood attack, where the victim is overwhelmed
with large UDP packets coming to different ports. The attacker generates
a series of packets, spoofing the source IP addresses. The generated pack-
ets are sent to multiple destination ports and the victim responds with an
ICMP protocol message of type ”Destination unreachable”, for every received
packet. This leads to exhaustion of resources and saturation of the network
link, eventually rendering the victim unresponsive to other clients.
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We perform anomaly detection procedure, as described in Algorithm 2
on the UDP traces containing UDP flood attack, using α = 0.01. The
attack dataset contains approximately 400 000 connection records. We use
the trained model on the three traces described earlier as the model for
normal traffic. We detect anomalies on second- and third-order subpaths.
As the model for normal traffic mostly contains well-known port numbers
and because UDP flood is designed to traverse as many different ports as
possible, it is expected that the number of anomalies will be high. This is
in fact the case. There are 390 671 anomalous second-order subpaths and
385 505 anomalous third-order subpaths. Only 3% of second-order subpaths
are in accordance with normal traffic, while 4% of third-order subpaths are
in accordance with normal traffic. A subset of found anomalies is visible in
Table 5.4.
Anomaly p-value
3111, 3176*, 3209* 0.0
1830, 2450*, 2576* 0.0
2261, 2524*, 2727* 0.0
7360, 7368*, 7452* 0.0
7028, 7168*, 7250* 0.0
5531, 5729*, 5739* 0.0
7997, 8037*, 8322* 0.0
2773, 2815*, 3063* 0.0
. . . . . .
Table 5.4: A subset of second-order subpaths detected as anomalies. Each
anomaly consists of random unprivileged port numbers that were used on
the same remote host, which is in accordance with the UDP flood attack
scenario.
There is a difference in anomaly detection using a model which captures
higher-order dependencies versus a model which captures only first-order de-
pendencies. The variable-order model is able to better capture the dynamics
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found in the 4.3 million connection records used as training data and finds less
anomalies than the first-order model (approximately 18 000 less). We next
attempt to see how the anomaly detection handles traffic in accordance with
previously seen data. This is important as in realistic scenarios attack traffic
is interleaved with normal traffic and we would like to avoid false positives
as much as possible. We divide the normal traffic on which the model was
trained into 90% training data and 10% test data, according to increasing
timestamps. We use the former for model training and the latter for anomaly
detection. The results show that 41% of all second-order subpaths (63 474 in
total) from test data are found to be anomalous and 36% of all third-order
subpaths (71 252 in total) from test data are anomalous. The numbers are
relatively high, but given many different application-layer protocols and only
3.8 million connection records as training data, this is reasonable.
Comparing variable-order model of maximum order K = 3 versus a first-
order model, both trained on the training set of 90% data once again reveals
that the variable-order model finds fewer anomalies than the first-order model
(4631 less anomalies). It is clear that higher-order dependencies allow for bet-
ter modeling of dynamics in the data, leading to fewer erroneous predictions
on which subpaths are anomalous. In fact, the strength of difference in the
set of anomalies predicted by the first-order model versus those predicted
by the variable-order model could be used as a measure of how important
higher-order patterns are, or to what degree the dataset exhibits higher-order
correlations.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The thesis has reviewed the latest research in the field of higher-order de-
pendencies and outlined the importance of taking into account transitions of
length larger than one (Chapter 2). The notion of higher-order networks was
introduced, along with the notion of variable-order networks that are more
economic in terms of the number of different transitions they encode. Scholtes
[9] in his general framework presents an equation which the variable-order
models use to encode transition probabilities. We use this equation (3.1) in
our anomaly detection procedure, presented in Chapter 3. Related work has
also highlighted the connection between time-based interactions and higher-
order dynamics. The time dimension affects the ordering of interactions,
which is the essence of higher-order correlations.
Algorithm 1 shows the proposed procedure for detecting significant in-
dividual higher-order patterns. Patterns of order k are deemed significant
because the variable-order model with reduced history size Mk−1 is unable
to generate them with appropriate frequency, while the variable-order model
Mk is able to do so. The procedure is extended to allow also for anomaly
detection, based on a trained variable-order model, as given in Algorithm
2. We check if our procedure is consistent on a set of artificial trajecto-
ries. The results show that the procedure correctly identifies higher-order
dependencies that were artificially generated and also that dependencies of
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higher-order cause appearance of lower-order dependencies. The anomaly
detection procedure correctly identifies anomalies when presented with an
alternative dataset.
Chapter 4 reveals the complexity of computer communication networks,
resulting from the layered architecture of the TCP/IP model. Identifying the
correct interpretation of nodes in our network and their interactions was a
cruical step. For instance, taking into account also the IP addresses of remote
hosts in addition to port numbers greatly affects the quality of our results.
We also discovered that not all computer communication networks exhibit
higher-order correlations. The CAIDA dataset [11] had poor overlap among
trajectories of different packet sources as it was not a consumer-oriented
network.
The results from Chapter 5 have reiterated the importance of model-
ing higher-order dynamics. Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 reveal many important
higher-order patterns which cannot be captured with first-order graphs. Fur-
thermore, these patterns also make sense, because we know how certain net-
work protocols function and interact with other protocols. Graphs in Figure
5.1 and Figure 5.2 highlight the changes in transition probabilities caused by
increased memory size. The magnitude of change in transition probabilities
can be better observed in adjacency matrices in Figure A.1 and Figure A.2.
Perhaps the best demonstration of the failure of first-order modeling is visible
in Figure 5.3, where a first-order graph fails to capture interaction between
the DNS and HTTP protocol, which we know is there.
The higher-order dependency modeling has a direct effect on the accuracy
of anomaly detection. Compared with the first-order model, variable-order
model detected fewer anomalies in a trace which contained a simulated UDP
flood attack. The detected anomalies themselves are correctly identified at-
tack patterns, corresponding to the repeated use of different ports on the
same remote host, as per UDP flood definition.
The shortcoming of our work is in the field of anomaly detection. Because
of lack of public datasets, which contain both normal and attack traffic, we
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were only able to test our procedure on a single dataset. The results are
optimistic as the attack traffic was isolated and not interleaved with normal
traffic. We also performed an experiment where we trained the model on a
90/10 split of the normal traffic data. The results show that a relatively large
number of patterns are found as false positives. The reason for this is lack
of data in the training phase. This is also a weakness of anomaly detection
using variable-order Markov chains. A large number of data is required to
capture all variations in computer network traffic.
Future work should focus on obtaining more datasets for testing the
anomaly detection procedure. We found it hard to gain access to a quality
datasets, preferably taken at a border router of a sub-network. Additional
datasets should give insights on how to improve our method. The method
itself leaves room for acting on the detected anomalies. We merely present a
procedure for detecting the anomalies. Further research should focus on how
to use the results and act to stop network attacks. We believe, however, that
the most important contribution of our work is the realization that higher-
order dependencies cannot be disregarded and that computer communication
networks do exhibit them.
Appendix A
Adjacency matrices for graphs
Adjacency matrices for graphs from Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3,
for clarity, as edge thickness may not be a good indicator.
login login* ftp X11* ftp* X11

login 0.25 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.1
login* 0.13 0.95 0.0 0.03 0.01 0.03
ftp 0.06 0.0 0.21 0.02 0.04 0.05
X11* 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.73 0.0 0.5
ftp* 0.03 0.01 0.68 0.03 0.89 0.02
X11 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.03 0.0 0.09
(a) Adjacency matrix for traditional,
first-order graph G(1) from Figure 5.1(a).
login login* ftp X11* ftp* X11

login 0.23 0.16 0.0 0.05 0.01 0.12
login* 0.16 0.22 0.0 0.04 0.01 0.0
ftp 0.24 0.05 0.34 0.0 0.04 0.24
X11* 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.47 0.0 0.46
ftp* 0.07 0.35 0.6 0.38 0.89 0.01
X11 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.03
(b) Adjacency matrix for first-order
graph G
(1)
FTP from Figure 5.1(b).
login login* ftp X11* ftp* X11

login 0.39 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.2
login* 0.19 0.97 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.07
ftp 0.05 0.0 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05
X11* 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.54 0.0 0.47
ftp* 0.03 0.0 0.86 0.04 0.92 0.04
X11 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.02
(c) Adjacency matrix for first-order
graph G
(1)
Login from Figure 5.1(c).
login login* ftp X11* ftp* X11

login 0.21 0.1 0.0 0.03 0.02 0.05
login* 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02
ftp 0.04 0.0 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02
X11* 0.15 0.52 0.0 0.8 0.26 0.58
ftp* 0.06 0.08 0.93 0.02 0.67 0.01
X11 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.0 0.25
(d) Adjacency matrix for first-order
graph G
(1)
X11 from Figure 5.1(d).
Figure A.1: Transition probabilities marked in red indicate a significant
pattern. The changes in transition probability clearly indicate how it is
important to take into account higher-order dynamics.
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50 APPENDIX A. ADJACENCY MATRICES FOR GRAPHS
login login* ftp X11* ftp* X11

login 0.23 0.16 0.0 0.05 0.01 0.12
login* 0.16 0.22 0.0 0.04 0.01 0.0
ftp 0.24 0.05 0.34 0.0 0.04 0.24
X11* 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.47 0.0 0.46
ftp* 0.07 0.35 0.6 0.38 0.89 0.01
X11 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.03
(a) Adjacency matrix for first-order
graph G
(1)
FTP from Figure 5.2(a).
login login* ftp X11* ftp* X11

login 0.4 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.22
login* 0.21 0.37 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.11
ftp 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.0 0.01 0.11
X11* 0.03 0.01 0.0 0.62 0.0 0.22
ftp* 0.05 0.33 0.83 0.08 0.93 0.0
X11 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(b) Adjacency matrix for first-order
graph G
(1)
FTP,Login∗ from Figure 5.2(b).
login login* ftp X11* ftp* X11

login 0.39 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.2
login* 0.19 0.97 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.07
ftp 0.05 0.0 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05
X11* 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.54 0.0 0.47
ftp* 0.03 0.0 0.86 0.04 0.92 0.04
X11 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.02
(c) Adjacency matrix for first-order
graph G
(1)
Login from Figure 5.2(c).
login login* ftp X11* ftp* X11

login 0.05 0.11 0.0 0.08 0.0 0.0
login* 0.21 0.15 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
ftp 0.05 0.0 0.07 0.02 0.0 0.14
X11* 0.08 0.62 0.0 0.61 0.0 0.29
ftp* 0.05 0.04 0.93 0.03 1.0 0.29
X11 0.29 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.29
(d) Adjacency matrix for first-order
graph G
(1)
Login,X11∗ from Figure 5.2(d).
Figure A.2: Transition probabilities marked in red indicate a significant
pattern. The changes in transition probability clearly indicate how it is
important to take into account higher-order dynamics.
domain http* domain* http

domain 0.69 0.0 0.47 0.0
http* 0.0 0.76 0.0 0.7
domain* 0.19 0.0 0.48 0.0
http 0.0 0.23 0.0 0.27
(a) Adjacency matrix for traditional,
first-order graph G(1) from Figure 5.3(a).
domain http* domain* http

domain 0.7 0.23 0.47 0.35
http* 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.46
domain* 0.2 0.05 0.48 0.0
http 0.0 0.14 0.0 0.15
(b) Adjacency matrix for first-order
graph G
(1)
domain from Figure 5.3(b).
Figure A.3: Transition probabilities marked in red indicate a significant
pattern.
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